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Introduction 
According to a certain, familiar way of dividing up the business of philosophy, 
made popular by Quine, ontology is concerned with the question of what entities 
exist (a task that is often identified with that of drafting a “complete inventory” of 
the universe) whereas metaphysics seeks to explain, of those entities, what they 
are (i.e., to specify the “ultimate nature” of the items included in the inventory).1 
For instance, a thesis to the effect that there are such things as colors or virtues 
would strictly speaking belong to ontology, whereas it would pertain to metaphys-
ics proper to establish whether such entities are Platonic forms, immanent univer-
sals, tropes, moments, or what have you. Likewise, it would fall within the scope 
of ontology to determine whether, when we speak of Sherlock Holmes, of the 
natural numbers, or of Sebastian’s walks in Bologna, we are truly speaking of 
things that belong to the furniture of the universe, but it would be a further meta-
physical task to say something precise in regard to the ultimate make-up of those 
things, if such there be—for instance, that Sherlock Holmes is a theoretical arti-
fact, that numbers are abstract individuals, that walks are property exemplifica-
tions, and so on.  
Of course, this view is everything but universal among philosophers. There 
are many other, different ways of understanding the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘meta-
physics’, some of which can certainly claim a respectable pedigree. For example, 
it is also common to think of ontology as a proper part of metaphysics—that part 
that has to do with what there is2—and there are even philosophers who use those 
terms in a way that is the exact opposite of the one I have just offered.3 But never 
mind; I am not interested in defending the view or in criticizing it, as very little 
depends on it. I am citing it just to fix a certain distinction and to settle on a termi-
nology. The question I wish to address concerns the relationship between the dis-
tinction—the relationship between ontology understood as the study of what there 
is and metaphysics understood as the study of what it is. I have always thought 
that the distinction carries with it a natural thought, namely, that ontology is in 
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some way prior to metaphysics. One must first of all figure out what things exist 
(or might exist); then one can attend to the further question of what they are, spec-
ify their nature, speculate on those features that make each thing the thing it is. Let 
us call this the priority thesis. I don’t think many philosophers have endorsed it 
explicitly, let alone argued for its truth. Nonetheless there is, I think, good evi-
dence that the priority thesis has been driving much philosophical work. Already 
Aristotle, for instance, was thinking along these lines, at least in some of his writ-
ings. A good example may be found in the Posterior Analytics, where he says that 
we must not only seek the facts and the reasons why, but also if something is or is 
not, ‘and knowing that it is, we seek what it is (e.g., so what is a god? or what is a 
man?)’ [II, 2, 89b34–35]. Thomas Aquinas was equally explicit in the Summa 
Theologiae, when he said that we must first establish whether God exists (an sit 
Deus) and then ask what he is (quid Deus sit)—a further question which, in his 
opinion, cannot in fact be answered [I, q.2, a.2, ad 2]. And what goes for God goes 
for everything. It is only on the assumption that numbers exist, for example, that 
Paul Benacerraf famously raised the question of what they could be (or not be).4 It 
is on the assumption that events are genuine denizens of reality that Donald Da-
vidson, Roderick Chisholm, Jaegwon Kim, and others embarked in endless quer-
rels concerning their nature and identity conditions.5 And it is generally on the as-
sumption that persons exist that monists and dualists, essentialists and convention-
alists, or endurantists and perdurantists engage in ever more lively debates on what 
persons are and how they differ from other existents. 
As I said, I sympathize with all this. Pace Descartes, who said that putting the 
an sit before the quid sit would violate “the laws of true logic”,6 I have always 
found that the priority thesis captures a natural thought, a practical necessity if not 
a norm, and I have always valued its guidance in assessing actual philosophical 
disagreements.7 I must say, however, that today the picture strikes me as more 
problematic than I used to admit. I still sympathize with the thesis, along with the 
sharp distinction between ontology and metaphysics that it presupposes. Yet there 
is a major worry lurking in the background, and there are several complications 
that emerge in the foreground. My purpose, here, is to address such worries and 
complications, and to come up with a plausible way of understanding the thesis 
that makes it both reasonable and, hopefully, useful. 
The Main Worry 
Let me begin with the main worry, and with the answer that I think can be offered. 
I will do so with the help of an example.  
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Suppose that two philosophers, Alpha and Beta, have fully worked out their 
ontological credos. In other words, suppose that each has managed to draw up a 
comprehensive inventory of all there is, which is to say: all he or she thinks there 
is. (How one goes about doing that is by itself a hairy issue, but let us suppose that 
our two philosophers have a method. Perhaps they first figured out their overall 
beliefs about the world and then looked for the underlying truth-makers; perhaps 
they reflected directly on their experience of the world; perhaps they relied on 
thought experiments, indispensability arguments, inference to the best explana-
tion.) In particular, let us suppose that both have included in their respective inven-
tories ordinary material objects such as statues, tables, apples, mountains, marble 
blocks, straw stacks, and so on. According to the priority thesis, at this point Alpha 
and Beta should be able to move on and work out their metaphysical credos by 
specifying the nature of such things, and nothing prevents them from parting com-
pany: they could agree that such things exist while disagreeing on what they are. 
(Otherwise their metaphysics would not follow their ontology; it would follow 
from their ontology, i.e., it would be determined by it.) For instance, both might 
agree on the reality of Michelangelo’s David while disagreeing in regard to its 
conditions of persistence through time: Alpha might be an endurantist whereas 
Beta might side with the perdurantists. Or they might disagree in regard to David’s 
“essential” properties: Alpha might think that David is necessarily constituted by 
that piece of marble, whereas Beta might think that David’s material constitution 
is just an accidental feature: Michelangelo might have carved it out of a different 
block of marble, if not from a block of cheese. They might also disagree on 
whether David is a primitive, irreducible entity as opposed to a derived or depend-
ent one, say a bundle of properties, or a bundle cum substratum. In short, accord-
ing to the priority thesis, Alpha and Beta are free to articulate the metaphysics of 
material objects that they prefer and as they see fit—and here comes the worry. 
Surely there is an important sense in which our two philosophers could be said to 
share the same ontology, at least partly: both acknowledge the existence of ordi-
nary material objects, among which Michelangelo’s David. It is also apparent, 
however, that they have radically different opinions regarding such things. In what 
sense, then, is it plausible to consign this divergence to a metaphysical sphere that 
would only start spinning when the ontological sphere comes to a rest? How can 
we say that Alpha’s and Beta’s inventories include the same entities, if the entities 
they include are metaphysically different?  
This is just an example. But similar considerations would apply to any sort of 
entity that our two philosophers might treat with equal ontological dignity. Gen-
erally speaking, agreeing on what existential assertions are true does not warrant 
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a corresponding agreement concerning the entities that make them true. Hence, the 
boundary between the an sit and the quid sit would seem to collapse and Des-
cartes’s complaint would strike back: one cannot truly fix an ontology without 
also, and at the same time, accepting or presupposing specific metaphysical views. 
Reply 
This is more than a worry, of course. It is a serious objection, and it would by it-
self suffice to discard the priority thesis along with the philosophical distinction on 
which it rests. Nonetheless, this line of thinking admits of a legitimate response—
actually two. 
The first and quick response is simply that there is nothing incoherent in the 
idea that two people—two philosophers—may have different opinions concerning 
one and the same entity. This is obvious in the case of ordinary opinions. For you 
the statue of David is splendid; for me it isn’t. It doesn’t follow that we are refer-
ring to two distinct Davids—one splendid and one unimpressive. We may have 
contrasting opinions in the context of scientific theorizing, too. For Newton, light 
was a stream of particles; for Huygens, it was a form of wave motion. It does not 
follow that Newton and Huygens were talking across each other. Well then, the 
same could be said of contrasting opinions in metaphysics, except that it might be 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine who is right. Alpha and Beta have differ-
ent opinions concerning the nature of Michelangelo’s David? It doesn’t follow that 
they are speaking of different things; they may just disagree on what that one thing 
is. As with you and me, or with Newton and Huygens, Alpha and Beta need not be 
talking across each other. They may sincerely assert the existence of the same 
thing—David—well before embarking in metaphysical speculations concerning its 
ultimate nature. (Compare: If an oracle told us that the correct metaphysic is per-
durantist, as Beta holds, it is reasonable to suppose that Alpha would not react by 
denying the existence of David. Simply, Alpha would accept the news and revise 
her views accordingly. This is, after all, what we all try to achieve when we argue 
with our colleagues: we all try to make them change their views on a certain sub-
ject, not to change the subject. In a way, this is also the lesson of Putnam’s argu-
ments concerning the theoretical status of scientific terms: Renaissance people 
used to think that water was one of the simple elements of which the sublunar 
world is composed; with Lavoisier we came to recognize that water is instead a 
compound of hydrogen and oxygen. Surely that is called progress. Otherwise we 
would have to conclude that Michelangelo thought he was drinking something else 
than what we think we are drinking.8)  
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This way of seeing things is confirmed, I think, by much philosophical prac-
tice that goes far beyond the example at issue. As I mentioned at the beginning, 
when two philosophers debate on the metaphysics of persons, for instance, they 
often take it for granted that they are agreeing on the object of their disagreement; 
they agree that there are persons and also on which things qualify as persons. It is 
when they begin questioning the nature of such entities—their persistence condi-
tions, the relationship between a person and her body, and so on—that their views 
may begin to diverge. Or think of the “species problem” in the philosophy of biol-
ogy. One may or may not agree that species are real entities (as opposed to theo-
retical constructs of some sort). But it seems to me than when two philosophers do 
agree on the reality of Homo sapiens, for instance, there is genuine ontological 
agreement even if our philosophers may not be inclined to favor the same meta-
physical account (one may think that Homo sapiens is a set of individuals while 
the other may think that Homo sapiens is itself an individual, albeit composed of 
many scattered organisms 9). Indeed, I would say that the search for a good meta-
physics of biological species can only be driven by the fact that we already know 
what we are talking about, for example, that the species Homo sapiens has a cer-
tain extension: as Hugh Paterson put it, when we trade ideas in biology, species 
are “our currency”, and it is with the value of that currency that one must come to 
terms.10 Or again—speaking of currency—think of the recent debate on the ontol-
ogy and metaphysics of social reality. Few would doubt that there are such things 
as dollar bills, passports, traffic lights, universities, weddings, nations, and so on. 
But when it comes to saying what they really are, there is plenty of room for dis-
agreement.11 (Even Marx’s treatment of commodities—the category of social ob-
jects that is the focus of no less than The Capital—begins with the claim that the 
analysis of such things shows them to be, in reality, ‘very queer things, abounding 
in metaphysical subtleties’.12) In short, I do not mean to deny that in some cases 
there may be lack of clarity in the way we answer the ontological question, but on 
the whole it seems to me that philosophical practice confirms to the priority thesis. 
At least, it lends support to the claim that the thesis is coherent: we may agree on 
the ontology and disagree on the metaphysics. 
One might reply that lack of clarity in at least some cases is enough to refute 
the thesis. For instance, often the question, ‘Do you believe in the existence of 
God?’, receives the answer, ‘It depends on what you mean by ‘God’’, and that 
may be taken to suggest that, pace Aquinas, here the an sit comes after the quid 
sit, not before. This is, after all, the reason why A. J. Ayer concluded that it makes 
no sense at all to speak of God’s existence, for he thought that the concept of God 
is meaningless.13 Fair enough. I am not saying that this way of putting things is 
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incoherent; my aim is to make sense of the opposite view. And to that end, I would 
here insist that there is a big difference between asking what God is and asking 
what is meant by ‘God’, or what our concept of God amounts to. If someone told 
me that she is using this word to refer to the creator of heaven and earth, or to an 
omnipotent being, I would have no difficulty in making up my mind concerning 
the existence or non-existence of something that fits the bill. Yet such definitions 
have no metaphysical content, on pain of degrading metaphysics to the point of 
saying that any attribution of properties falls within its province. Such definitions 
tell me nothing about the nature of God; they just give me some instructions to go 
and see whether my inventory of all there is includes a certain item. They are iden-
tifying descriptions, if you like, not characterizing descriptions. And it wouldn’t 
change much if the meaning of ‘God’ were explained through a definition packed 
with robust metaphysical jargon: as an elucidation of the meaning of a word, such 
an explanation would not belong to metaphysics but to the semantics of our lan-
guage, and it would be a bad explanation precisely because of its metaphysical 
noise. It is in this purely semantic sense, also, that we may sometimes use the quid 
sit language rather than the an sit language in doing ontology. For instance, I 
would express my anti-realism about meanings by saying that I have not the faint-
est idea of what meanings are supposed to be. That would not be a profession of 
metaphysical ignorance. It would be a way of saying that I have no idea where to 
find such putative entities, and my anti-realist attitude would mainly follow from 
of the fact that none of the entities about which I have solid ontological intuitions 
fits any definition of ‘meaning’ offered by those linguists and philosophers of lan-
guage who take meanings seriously (functional, non metaphysical definitions).  
An Optional Exercise 
So much for the first reply to the worry on the table: there is nothing incoherent in 
the thought that one could assert the existence of certain entities before embarking 
in metaphysical speculations concerning their ultimate nature. But I said that there 
is a second reply, and the second reply is that there is nothing incoherent even in 
the thought that we could limit ourselves to proclaiming our ontological credo 
without embarking at all in metaphysical speculations.  
Consider what happens in mathematics. Most mathematicians would not hesi-
tate to say (or to admit, if pressed) that they are serious about numbers—that num-
bers are indeed to be included in a good inventory of what there is as the truth-
makers of certain mathematical truths. Yet few would be willing to go further and 
say something committal about the nature of such truth-makers—to say what 
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numbers really are. For most mathematicians, numbers are the referents of certain 
expressions and their fundamental properties are fixed by certain axioms—period. 
Surely one could go further, for example by insisting on the abstract nature of such 
entities: numbers are immaterial, have no spatio-temporal location, do not enter 
into causal interaction, etc. One could even be more precise. For instance, some 
would say that numbers are abstract individuals encoding exactly the mathematical 
properties they are supposed to have.14 Others might want to say that numbers are 
classes satisfying those properties, for instance cumulative sets à la Zermelo (as 
Alpha might put it: 0 is the empty set and every other number is the singleton of its 
immediate predecessor), or cumulative sets à la von Neuman (as Beta might insist: 
0 is the empty set and every other number is the set of its predecessors).15 Surely 
there are several options out there. Still, it is a fact that mathematical practice does 
not require that we choose among those options: the choice is perceived by many 
as a pointless metaphysical question that is not worth the time (and here the term 
‘metaphysics’ tends to acquire that negative connotation stigmatized by Carnap 
and the neopositivists16). What matters is not the nature of numbers but the princi-
ples that govern number theory. Well, then, if that is how things work in mathe-
matics, one might hold a parallel view with regard to other contexts as well. Surely 
many biologists feel that way in regard to the metaphysical disputes on the nature 
of species, for instance. And the same may be said of any metaphysical dispute 
vis-à-vis a common ontological stance, including disputes over the metaphysics of 
ordinary objects. ‘Surely statues are real things, but don’t ask me what they are 
because I wouldn’t know what to answer. I have never thought about that—and 
never will!’ What truly matters—one could say—are the principles and laws that 
govern our favorite theories, whose truth depends on the existence of the entities 
they refer to or quantify over. Then one is free to go further and specify the meta-
physical make-up of such entities. But that is an optional task, not a prerequisite 
for their legitimate inclusion in our inventory of the universe.  
One could counter that this reply is open to a serious accusation: a philosopher 
that would just assert the existence of certain entities without saying what they are 
would be engaging in empty talk. In some domains, this complete severance be-
tween the an sit and the quid sit seems ludicrous: in saying that there are such 
things as quarks, for instance, a physicist has better explain what they are, other-
wise her existential statement would be unintelligible. Why should it be different 
in math? More importantly, why should it be different in philosophy? To proclaim 
the existence of numbers, species, or statues whatever they are is ontologically un-
informative. It is of no help whatsoever in drawing up a good inventory of the uni-
verse, as when Piglet and Pooh Bear insist that woozles exist but leave it at that.17 
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(There is also an epistemic variant of this complaint. For how can we know that 
something is ‘unless we have some concept of that which we know to be’, as Duns 
Scotus put it? [Ordinatio, I, d.3, q.2, schol.] Even Aquinas, in some texts, might be 
read as expressing caution in this regard, as when he wrote that we cannot know 
ourselves to possess chastity ‘if we don’t know what chastity is’. [De Veritate, 
q.10, ar.9, co.]) 
However, that is not quite the right way of putting it. As I mentioned, in the 
case of numbers we are not left entirely in the dark: whatever they are, numbers 
must enjoy a specific range of properties, say those properties that define the 
axiomatic corpus of Peano arithmetic. In saying that numbers exist, Alpha and 
Beta are committing themselves to the existence of entities that enjoy those prop-
erties. Their agreement is not empty. And their disagreement will only surface in 
regard to additional properties, properties that fall without the concerns of arithme-
tic, including those properties that reflect a precise metaphysical characterization 
of numbers (for instance, set-theoretic properties: according to Beta, the number 0 
belongs to the number 2; non so for Alpha). Likewise, in the case of entities such 
as the statue of David there is a whole range of properties that such things are sup-
posed to have in virtue of the application conditions, or “meaning postulates”, that 
come with the correct use of the word ‘statue’—properties such as having a certain 
origin, a certain purpose, perhaps a certain mass, and so on. Such postulates reflect 
a bunch of common-sense truths and do not, therefore, constitute a rigorous axio-
matic theory comparable to arithmetic, but that is beyond the point. The point is 
that in asserting the existence of statues, say, both Alpha (an endurantist) and Beta 
(a perdurantist) are committing themselves to the existence of entities that enjoy 
such properties.18 It is simply not true that they do not attach any meaning to the 
word ‘statue’. Their disagreement concerns certain additional properties (such as 
the possession of proper temporal parts) on which common sense says nothing at 
all and from which the correct use of the word ‘statue’ does not depend in the 
least. We could even say that precisely for this reason, as in the case of numbers, 
the disagreement between Alpha and Beta is “purely metaphysical”. And if a third 
philosopher, Gamma, were to confine herself to saying that statues exist, thus 
agreeing with both Alpha and Beta while suspending judgment in regard to their 
disagreement, indeed without even addressing the challenge of further specifying 
the nature of statues, it would be unfair to complain that she is speaking empty 
words. At most, one could point out that spelling out her ontological credo does 
not exhaust the philosophical task of providing a comprehensive picture of what 
there is: a good philosopher should complete the picture by also spelling out the 
underlying metaphysics.19 
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One might still rejoin that the application conditions or meaning postulates as-
sociated with what I have called “common-sense truths”, such as the postulates 
that fix the correct use of the word ‘statue’, are not metaphysically neutral: on the 
contrary, they would surreptitiously embody an inplicit “common-sense metaphys-
ics” which even a philosopher such as Gamma would be embracing just by speak-
ing English.20 But I think this rejoinder would reflect a conception of the scope of 
metaphysics (in the sense in which I am using this term) that is simply too narrow. 
As already mentioned in regard to the word ‘God’, not any old property attribution 
contributes to a characterization of the metaphysical quid sit, and I would say that 
the attribution of those properties that are constitutive of our linguistic compe-
tence—precisely those properties that I am referring to when I speak of “meaning 
postulates”, vague as this expression might be—contributes nothing at all. It 
merely serves the purpose of fixing the referent. Those attributes don’t say what a 
thing is but only how it is, or rather what it is like. Otherwise we are back to the 
idea that in Michelangelo’s mouth, the word ‘water’ referred to something else 
than what we call ‘water’ today. Worse, we would be led to the idea that natural 
language, or rather any given language, has its own metaphysics and ontology, and 
this would take us straight to the slippery slope of Whorfian relativism.21  
Does it follow, then, that the ontology/metaphysics opposition rests implicitly 
on the analytic/synthetic distinction that so many of us have kicked away?22 No, it 
doesn’t. It would follow, if the latter distinction went hand in hand with the dis-
tinction between what is constitutive and what is not constitutive of linguistic 
competence, as in Carnap.23 But there are beliefs that are constitutive of linguistic 
competence that could hardly be classified as analytic. For instance, anyone who 
can use the term ‘statue’ correctly will promtly assent to the truth of statements 
such as ‘Statues are mute’ or ‘Statues don’t fit into your wallet’, but I would not 
say that such statements are analytic rather than synthetic. More generally, when a 
philosopher such as Gamma says ‘There are Fs’, the properties she attributes to 
the Fs are not just those properties G such that ‘The Fs are G’ is an analytic truth, 
and it may well be that they do not even include all those properties (if such 
there be).24 The properties she attributes to the Fs are neither more nor less than 
those properties that we would find, if not in the dictionary, in a glossary entry for 
What’s What.25 
Neutrality and Indeterminacy 
Pushing this line of thinking further, I would even say that the indeterminacy of a 
philosopher such as Gamma—the indeterminacy of an ontology without meta-
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physics—is not so different from other forms of indeterminacy that afflict much of 
our ordinary talk about the world. For instance, it is no news that ordinary lan-
guage expressions can be vague; our linguistic practices have not fixed their mean-
ing with absolute precision. Our lexicon includes predicates such as ‘bald’, even 
though we have not settled on a clear criterion for classifying each person as either 
bald or not bald. We have names or singular terms such ‘Everest’ or ‘downtown 
Manhattan’, even though we lack a precise criterion for drawing a boundary 
around their referents. It is that way because in ordinary circumstances such lack 
of precision is of no consequence. If, for example, we say that Everest is in Asia, 
our statement turns out to be true no matter how we suppose the relevant indeter-
minacy to be resolved: No matter how we suppose a precise boundary to be traced 
around the referent of ‘Everest’, subject to the constraints set by our linguistic 
practices, we would come up with an object that is located entirely in Asia. Well, 
then—the metaphysical neutrality of ontology may be understood along similar 
lines. Alpha and Beta agree in saying that the statue of David exists and is in Flor-
ence because this assertion is equally true on their respective conceptions (endu-
rantist and perdurantist, for instance), provided the term ‘statue’ preserves all rele-
vant semantic traits it has in English. And it is precisely for this reason that 
Gamma may even afford making the same existential assertion without taking a 
stance on those conceptions. No matter how the semantics of ‘statue’ is topped off 
with an explicit metaphysics—no matter how one resolves all residual indetermi-
nacy concerning what statues really are—that existential assertion turns out to be 
true. (I would even say that claims about the existence of God admit of a similar 
explanation, at least in light of what I said above, so much so that many believers 
are content with the mere existential statement of their credo.) 
To make the analogy with semantic vagueness more explicit, I am saying that 
the truth conditions of ontological claims obey the principles of a supervaluational 
semantics:26 the corpus of those truths that are presupposed by our ontological 
credo is defined by assertions that are metaphysically “super-true”, i.e., true no 
matter how one specifies the metaphysical make-up of the entities referred to or 
quantified over by those assertions. Of course, in some cases this strategy does not 
pay off. For instance, the truth or falsity of a statement such as ‘What you are now 
seeing is the current temporal part of Michelangelo’s David’ depends in a crucial 
way on the relevant metaphysics, exactly as the truth or falsity of a statement such 
as ‘What you are now stepping on is part of Mount Everest’ may depend in a cru-
cial way on how we suppose a precise boundary to have been traced to fix the ref-
erence. Such statements are, for common sense, indeterminate, i.e., neither true 
nor false. But that should come as no surprise: it is precisely at this juncture that 
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we find room for genuine metaphysical disagreement. What I am suggesting is that 
such a disagreement does not coincide with a dispute among different ontologies, 
and in some cases (or “for certain purposes”, as some like to say) it can even be 
deemed irrelevant. It is necessary to specify an ontology in order to attach a mean-
ing, however vague, to our statements; to spell out the underlying metaphysics is a 
task that is only needed to overcome any residual indeterminacy.  
Complications 
So much for the first part of the story: the main worry and my reply to it. Unfortu-
nately, the story does not end here. As I mentioned, there are several further com-
plications, and it is not clear to what extent such complications can be overcome 
without jepardizing the very idea of a sharp boundary between ontology and meta-
physics. I will consider three distinct complications.27 
The first concerns identity issues. Suppose that Gamma decides to go along 
with Alpha’s metaphysics: statues are enduring entities, and likewise for any other 
material object. More: Gamma also agrees with Alpha that statues have certain 
essential properties that contribute to determining what they are. For instance, she 
agrees that the material constitution of a statue is an essential property: Had 
Michelangelo used a different piece of marble, the outcome would not have been 
David—the object whose existence is firmly asserted by Alpha and Gamma (and 
by Beta)—but a similar yet numerically distinct statue. At this point we ask for 
details concerning the relationship between the statue of David and the corre-
sponding amount of marble and, mirabile dictu, we get different answers. Gamma 
says they are one and the same thing: the statue is the marble (the relation of mate-
rial constitution being nothing but identity); Alpha says they are distinct (for in-
stance, because they have different modal properties: throwing a stone would de-
stroy the statue, not the marble; had Michelangelo left the job unfinished, the 
statue would not have existed while the marble would have been there; and so on). 
Now, not every identity dispute is metaphysically loaded; in many cases it is just a 
matter of figuring out the right interaction between sense and reference, as with 
the morning star and the evening star. But I take it as obvious that here the dis-
agreement between Gamma and Alpha goes beyond language and falls squarely 
within the domain of metahysics: Gamma is a monist, Alpha a dualist. It is equally 
obvious, however, that such a disagreement immediately implies a disagreement at 
the ontological level: Alpha’s inventory would include two items where Gamma 
only contains one. Indeed, in this connection the very idea that Gamma could steer 
away from all metaphysical troubles appears to be more problematic than I sug-
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gested above. Suspending any judgment on the identity or distinctness between the 
statue and the marble would yield an indeterminacy in the number of things, and 
this sort of indeterminacy can hardly be construed as a semantic issue. 
A similar, but distinct problem arises in connection with reductionism issues. 
Suppose Delta is a philosopher for whom reality is at bottom constituted by all and 
only those entities that are posited by a certain scientific theory, say subatomic 
particles. Given the question ‘Do statues exist?’, Delta would not answer in the 
negative; she would say Yes, but she would hasten to clarify that statues, like any 
other macroscopic objects, are nothing over and above swarms of particles. (Delta 
is a reductionist, not an eliminativist.) Evidently, this sort of clarification pertains 
to the metaphysical sphere: it says what statues really are. Yet, again, its repercus-
sions at the ontological level are immediate: someone who does not agree with 
Delta, i.e., a non-reductionist, would end up countenancing a larger number of dis-
tinct objects—statues and swarms of particles. They would agree on everything, 
yet their everythings would be distinct. 
The third complication arises in connection with negative existential claims. 
Concerning statues and other ordinary objects, Delta is a reductionist, but when it 
comes to a whole range of putative entities postulated by her fellow philosophers, 
she is a firm eliminativist: there are no such things as species, numbers, meanings, 
or what have you. Plainly, such convictions pertain to the ontological sphere: they 
concern the question of what there is (or is not). Yet it is not clear how one could 
come to have convictions of this sort if not on the basis of some understanding of 
what species, numbers, meanings, etc., are supposed to be. In other words, and 
more generally, while it may be true that our positive beliefs about the denizens of 
world may be grounded in various ways, beginning with our direct experience of 
their reality, it’s by no means clear how we could reach a negative ontological de-
cision if not on the basis of some characterization of the putative entities whose 
existence we are going to deny. Now, there is no reason to suppose that every such 
characterization must belong to the metaphysical sphere. In order to deny the exis-
tence of winged horses, for instance, it suffices that I understand the concept of a 
winged horse, and this only requires that I be in possession of the basic application 
conditions or meaning postulates that govern the correct use of the predicates 
‘winged’ and ‘horse’. Arguably, one could say the same also in regard to philoso-
phically more interesting candidates, such as numbers or meanings 28—in fact, I 
have said so already. My anti-realist attitude toward such things grew out of my 
coming to realize that none of the entities about whose existence I have solid evi-
dence appears to match the definitions of ‘meaning’ or ‘number’ that I am aware 
of, and such definitions need not involve any serous metaphysics: they can be 
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purely axiomatic (as with numbers) or functional (meanings). Still, Delta’s elimi-
nativism may not be entirely grounded on semantic postulates of this sort. At least 
in some cases, it may stem from a genuine metaphysical account—partial and ap-
proximate though it might be—of the nature of things. ‘There are no such entities 
as meanings. For meanings are supposed to be abstract, and there are no abstract 
entities.’ This is certainly a common way of putting things. And to the extent that 
it is a legitimate way, it lends evidence to the thought that at least in some cases 
metaphysics must come before ontology, not after. (Indeed, it would immediately 
follow from negative claims of this sort that even Delta’s positive ontological 
claims are metaphysically loaded. For the claim that statues exist together with the 
claim that abstract entities do not exist entail that statues are not abstract—a claim 
that falls squarely within the domain of metaphysics.) 
To Be and Not to Be 
As I said, I am not sure whether such complications can be overcome without 
jepardizing the very idea of a sharp boundary between ontology and metaphysics, 
hence the priority thesis. But let me try.   
To begin with, I will simply say that the first two complications—Is the statue 
something distinct from the marble? Is it something over and above a mere swarm 
of particles?—do not necessarily spell trouble for the ontology/metaphysics dis-
tinction. They would if we stuck to the popular idea, which I have hitherto en-
dorsed, that to answer the ontological question What is there? is tantamount to 
drawing up a “complete inventory” of the universe. The inventory metaphor re-
quires that we come to terms with issues of identity, for a good inventory ought to 
be exhaustive as well as non-redundant, i.e., it ought not to contain repetitions or 
double counting of any sort. As such, the task of drawing up a good inventory of 
the universe is soaked with metaphysical considerations. Strictly speaking, how-
ever, the ontological question does not require that much. To answer the question 
What is there? we have to come up with a list of what there is. Insofar as Gamma 
believes in the existence of statues, she would not object to a list that included 
statues, and insofar as she believes in the existence of marble pieces, she would 
not object to a list that included marble pieces. She might complain that a list that 
includes both, such as Alpha’s, is redundant, because Gamma’s monist metaphys-
ics says that statues are marble pieces. But that’s not to say that Gamma disagrees 
with anything that Alpha says in reply to the ontological question; their disagree-
ment is metaphysical after all, not ontological. Likewise, insofar as Delta believes 
that statues are swarms of particles, she would not object to a list that included 
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statues just as she would not object to a list that included swarms of particles. She 
might say that a list that includes both sorts of thing, such as Alpha’s, is redundant, 
because Delta’s reductionist metaphysics says that statues are swarms of particles. 
But that’s not to say that Delta disagrees with anything that Alpha says in reply to 
the ontological question; once again, their disagreement is metaphysical, not onto-
logical. In short, it is true that Alpha’s ontology is more promiscuous than 
Gamma’s or Delta’s, but that is not the sense of ‘ontology’ that I’ve been focusing 
on: it stands for ontology as a theory, not as a sphere of inquiry. As a theory, any 
ontology should be metaphysically loaded; that is, after all, the point of Quine’s 
precept, No entity without identity.29 But as a field of inquiry, we can still keep on-
tology separate from metaphysics. We just have to get rid of the inventory meta-
phor. (I would say the same when it comes to issues of identity that are not meta-
physically loaded. For instance, if Alpha included in her inventory the morning 
star along with the evening star, she would not be doing a good job and we would 
be entitled to complain. Yet our complaint would be epistemic, not ontological. 
Drawing up a good inventory requires a great deal of empirical and theoretical 
knowledge just as it requires metaphysical sophistication, but these are obligations 
that go beyond the purview of the an sit question.) 
As for the third complication—which I have illustrated through the case of 
negative existential claims—the picture is different. Here the challenge is serious 
and perhaps one should just bite the bullet and say that the priority thesis is hope-
less. Indeed, there is a strong temptation to say that the thesis should be reversed: 
one must first attend to the metaphysical task of characterizing the nature of a va-
riety of candidate entities and then figure out a way of telling which, among those 
candidates, truly exist. This was, after all, Meinong’s idea, whereby any inquiry 
concerning the being so, or such-and-such, of a thing (its Sosein) has priority over 
the question of its being there (its Dasein).30 Nevertheless, there are two good rea-
sons why I think this need only be a temptation—a temptation that one can and 
should avoid. 
First, we can avoid it if we draw a more careful distinction between Aquinas’s 
way of illustrating the task of ontology and Quine’s more recent way, between the 
an sit question and the question What is there? So far I have been treating those 
questions as equivalent. However, there is an important difference. The an sit is 
dubitative: it is about whether a certain entity or type of entity exists. Aquinas was 
raising the question in regard to God, but we can certainly raise it also in regard to 
entities such as numbers, species, meanings, and so on. Since an answer to queries 
of this sort may be in the affirmative as well as in the negative, it follows that if we 
identify ontology with the an sit we end up having to deal, not only with the ques-
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tion ‘What is there?’, but also with the question ‘What is not there?’ Now, in itself 
neither question is in dubitative form. But while answering the second question 
triggers the complication that I have mentioned—the need for a preliminary meta-
physical characterization—focusing exclusively on the first question, i.e., on 
Quine’s question, need not involve any metaphysical work: we only have to be 
explicit about the motivations and methodology that lead us to acknowledge the 
existence of certain things—motivations and methodology which, as I have al-
ready said, may range widely and need not involve metaphysical considerations. 
So we must decide: ontology in Aquinas’s sense, or ontology in Quine’s narrower 
sense? It seems to me that, regardless of terminology, the second option is per-
fectly sufficient to capture the sense of ontology that matters the most. It is pre-
cisely because what matters is what there is that the inventory metaphor strikes us 
as prima facie adequate to characterize the task of ontology: an inventory is sup-
posed to be a census of all citizens of the universe, not a register of all possible 
citizenship applications along with their respective verdicts. If so, then there is no 
need to reverse the order of the priority thesis. We can still say that ontology 
comes first. Indeed, we could even insist that the negative question, ‘What is not 
there?’, is ipso facto answered indirectly: after all, in answering Quine’s positive 
question we are supposed to list everything. If none of the things in the list fulfills 
the definition of ‘winged horse’, then there are no winged horses. And if none of 
those things obeys to the laws of arithmetic, then there are no numbers. We just 
have to give up on the standard practice of spelling out our negative ontological 
credo directly, which is to say via negative existential claims, at least insofar as 
such claims involve a metaphysical characterization of the putative entities whose 
existence is being denied. Admittedly, this calls for some revision in the ordinary 
way of describing ontological disputes, but so be it. The practice is not the theory. 
(Thus, to go back to our example, Delta’s eliminativism about meanings—insofar 
as it stems from their putative “abstract” nature—would be on a par with her re-
ductionism about statues. Both would be genuine pieces of metaphysics, not meta-
physically driven ontological tenets.) 
Second, here is why I think that, not only we can, but we should resist the 
temptation of reversing the order between ontology and metaphysics. We should 
resist it because the reversal would justify a naive relativistic stance that we should 
better eschew. For suppose we accepted the view in question, according to which 
one can only figure out what there is on the basis of a comprehensive map of all 
the options—a map of all those categories or types of entity which are at least 
prima facie candidates to existence. The slogan would be: to decide what there is, 
one must first establish what there could conceivably be. Or: one should first fix 
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the intension of all possible categories, and only afterward attend to the question 
of their actual extension. Now, obviously that would only work if the map of all 
the options were ontologically neutral, i.e., only if it did not fail to incorporate a 
category simply because we thought that it was empty. Otherwise we would be 
running in a circle. It is also obvious, however, that the idea of a map of categories 
that is completely neutral in this sense is wishful thinking. We can try as hard as 
we like, pushing our sense of immagination, our linguistic intuitions, our combina-
torial dexterity, but what would ensure that the outcome would not betray biases 
and presuppositions that are mere evidence of our particular way of seeing things 
(if not of our culture and age, as already Collingwood put it31)? The skeptic would 
not hesitate to protest than any method or criterion one might choose would only 
be one out of many equally legitimate methods or criteria, hence that any system 
of categories we might propose would just be a candidate among many others. 
And this would either give rise to an infinite regress or give in to the cheapest kind 
of relativism.  
Besides—and finally—the very idea of an a priori system of categories that is 
truly comprehensive is wishful thinking, too. We know all too well how things 
have worked—or failed to work—in other fields of inquiry.32 When Marco Polo 
saw the rhinoceroses in Java, the best he could do was to classify them as uni-
corns. When the Aztecs hastened to the coast to witness the landing of the first 
conquistadores, they thought the Spaniards were riding deer because they could 
not think of a different sort of quadruped of that size. Not to mention the Austra-
lian colonists who first ran into that weird ‘duck-billed’ animal we now call the 
platypus. What sort of beast was that? Not a BIRD, in spite of the beak. Not a 
MAMMAL, because it laid eggs. And not a REPTILE, for its blood was warm. For 
over eighty years, naturalists from all over the world were baffled. Still in 1800 the 
German anatomist Johann Blumenbach came up with the name Ornithorynchus 
paradoxus.33 Not a good name, perhaps, but a telling one: one way or the other the 
beast was there but the category was missing. I see no reason why philosophers 
should think that the task of drawing up a complete system of categories should 
not run into the same problem. Surely we can always add a category that fits the 
bill—that it, the duckbill. But that is precisely the point: first comes the thing, then 
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